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Anyone surveying the political life of this planet in the late twen-
tieth century is bound to he struck by the prominence of two power-
ful but conflicting tendencies. The first of these is the tendency toward 
greater economic, technological, and political integration, a tendency 
that has been fueled in a variety of ways hy the extraordinary progress 
of modern science in this century. The second is the tendency toward 
greater communal identification and differentiation, a tendency that 
is evident in the recent resurgence of nationalism as a political force, 
in the rise of the idea of multiculturalism, and in the seemingly end-
less series of ethnic and communal conflicts to which recent years have 
been witness. 
Among the many issues raised by these conflicting global and par-
ticularist tendencies are a variety of questions about responsibility. Most 
obviously, perhaps, there is the question of how we arc to understand 
our own responsibilities to diverse categories of people: to our fami-
lies and friends, to the people in our neighborhoods and communi-
ties, to the members of other groups with which we arc affiliated, and, 
of course, to those vast numbers of people who are strangers to us, 
and with whom our only significant social bond, if it can be called that, 
is that we are all membet·s of the humanntce. This question is hardly 
a new one, and various cultures ha\'e at various tinu·s had reasonably 
settled ways of answering it. However, our own thinking about ques-
tions of responsibility seems to me to he in a very unstable condition, 
and the conflicting tendencies toward integration and differentiation 
that I have mentioned may be seen both as symptomatic of this con-
dition and as serving to exacerbate it. 
The commonsense morality of our culture holds that each of us 
has certain responsibilities toward otlwr people simply as such - to 
avoid various forms of mistreatment, f(Jr example, and also to prm·ide 
limited forms of assistance in certain contt~xt". At the same time, com-
monsense morality holds that there arc additional and often much 
greater responsibilities that tht· memlll'rs of significant social groups 
and the participants in close personal relationships ha\'c to each 
othcr. 1 It is these additional responsibilities, which may he called "as-
sociative duties,"that I wish to discuss in this lecture.~ Some philoso-
phers have expressed scepticism ahotll whether associative duties 
constitute genuine duties at all, except perhaps insofar as they can be 
assimilated to duties of other kinds. Other philosophers have seen as-
sociative duties as absolutely central to moral life, and have seen scep-
ticism about them as the outgrowth of an excessive, theory-driven 
universalism. My aim in this lecture is neither to dispute nor to de-
fend the claim that associative duties constitute genuine duties. In-
stead, I wish to explore the nature ofthesc duties as they are ordinarily 
understood, to emphasize their importance within commonsense 
moral thought, to consider some possible explanations of their basis 
or rationale, and to indicate why, despite their centrality, they seem 
in some ways puzzling or problematic from a standpoint internal to 
our commonsense moral outlook itself. If I am right, then the con-
Uicting tendencies on the political level toward integration and dif:. 
ferentiation are mirrored within our moral thought by conflicting views 
about the boundaries of our responsibilities. 
I. 
According to a familiar distinction, gnwml dutie~ arc duties that we 
have to people as such, whereas sj1edal dutirs are duties that we have 
only to those particular people with whom we have had certain sig-
nificant sorts of interactions or to whom we stand in certain signifi-
cant sorts of rclations.:1 Given this distinction, associative dmies arc 
of course a class of special duties. Other widely recognized classes of 
duties that are special in this sense include contractual dulit!s- by which 
I mean duties arising out of promises, contract'!, and agreements, rPfmr-
tllive duties- or duties to people one has wronged or harmed or mis-
treated;' and duties of J.,"mtitude- or duties to one's benefactors. 
There arc many diftcrcnt kinds of groups and relationships par-
ticipation in which has at least sometimes been seen as giving rise to 
associative duties.5 Obviously, individuals arc usually thought to have 
such duties to the members of their immediate families. In addition, 
however, people have been said to have associative duties to their 
friends, neighbors, and more distant relati\'es; to members of the 
same community, nation, or clan; to colleagues, coworkers and lei-
low union members; to dao;smates, compatriots, and comrades; to mem-
bers of the same religious or racial or ethnic group; and even to 
members of the same team, gang, or dub.'; 
There is no ob,·iuus feature that all of the relationships just men-
tioned have in common. Some of those relationships arc ordinarily 
entered into voluntarily, bm others of them cannot be. Many of the 
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relationships on the list can be terminated voluntarily. hut, again, oth-
ers of them cannot he. In some cases, the people to whom one is said 
to have associath·e duties arc people who ha\·e come to depend or rely 
on one in certain ways, but this is not so in all cases. Some of the re-
lationships mentioned involve people who are engaged in some com-
mon cooperative enterprise, but others do not. And while some of the 
relationships can only arise among peopll~ who know each other wdl, 
in other· cases the participants need ne\"Cr have met or had any sort 
of interaction. The apparent diversity of these relationships presents 
a primtl facie difficulty for any view that proposes to assimilate associath•e 
duties to some putatively clearer or more fundamental category of du-
ties: to contractual duties, for example, or to duties of gratitude. 
While any given proposal of this kind may ha\"C a measure of plausi-
bility in some cases, it will be dillicult lor any such proposal to ac-
commodate the full range of groups and relationships participation 
in which has been thought to give rise to associative duties. 
Of course, although the vast m;~jority of people believe themselves 
to have a variety of associath·e duties, many people are, at the same 
time, unsympathetic to some of the perfectly sir1een· claims of duty 
made by others. For example, some people who arc in no doubt 
about their associative duties to their friends or to the members of 
their own families arc neverthell·ss unreceptive or even hostile to the 
idea that members of the same national or ethnic or religious group 
have special, associative duties to each other. Thus, although many 
different kinds of groups and relationships have been seen as gener-
ating associative duties, there is only limited consensus about when 
such duties do in fact arise. 
The best explanation of this diversity and disagreement is that vir-
tually any kind of group or personal relationship that has significance 
for the people it unites may be seen by them as ghing rise to associative 
duties. This would explain the otherwise heterogeneous assortment 
of groups and relationships that have been seen as generating such 
duties. It would also explain why many people who believe that they 
themselves have associative duties of various kinds arc nevertheless re-
sistant to some of the deeply-felt claims of duty made by others. For, 
if we disapprove or certain sorts of groups and relationships, or of the 
tendency to invest participation in those groups and relationships with 
significance, then we may be reluctant to regard such participation 
as generating associative duties. If we disapprove of gangs, or of 
unions, or of religion, then we may he unreceptive to the suggestion 
that members of the same gang or union or religious group have spc-
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cial moral duties to each other. If, on the other hand, we attach great 
importance to our own membership in a group of a certain kind, then 
not only are we apt to see ourselves as having duties to the other mem-
bers of the group, we may also be inclined to suppose that member-
ship in a group of this kind always gives rise to such duties, and we 
may disapprove of group members who fail to acknowledge their du-
ties as we see them. 
II. 
In addition to the diversity of associative duties and the limited con-
sensus about when they arise, there is also considerable unclarity, within 
commonsense moral thought, about the content of such duties. 7 One 
thing that is clear is that this may v-c~.ry depending on the nature of the 
group or relationship that gives rise to the duty. An athlete may have 
associative duties both to her teammates and to her family, say, but 
nobody supposes that the content of these duties will be exactly the 
same in the two cases. Even with respect to a particular type of group 
or relationship, however, the precise content of the participants' du-
ties is often difficult to specifY. In general, philosophers who discuss 
associative duties tend to characterize them as duties to provide pos-
itive benefits for one's associates (as I shall refer to them), duties that 
go beyond whatever positive duties we may already have toward peo-
ple in general. It is understood, in these discussions, that the content 
of the additional benefits to be provided may vary depending on the 
nature of the group or relationship in question. However, it seems gen-
erally to be assumed that associative duties do not involve any addi-
tion to or strengthening of our negative duties - our duties not to 
harm or mistreat people. This assumption is compatible, of course, 
with a recognition that the same relationships that give rise to asso-
ciative duties can also create special opportunities for mistreatment, 
and can, indeed, make possible specially intimate forms of mistreat-
ment. Thus, even if one docs not regard such relationships as giving 
rise to additional negative duties, one may nevertheless sec them as 
creating new opportunities for the violation of those negative duties 
that we already have. 
This consideration notwithstanding, it oversimplifies matters to 
think of associative duties solely as positive duties that go beyond our 
positive duties to people in general. To see this, we may first observe 
that this characterization itself is normally taken to mean not only that 
one's positive duties to one's associates are more extensive than one's 
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posith•e duties to other people, but also that they are stronger. This 
"greater strength," in turn, comprises more than one feature. First, it 
means that one's positive duties to one's associates are less easily nul-
lified or overridden than one's positive duties to others by consider-
ations of cost to oneself. Thus, for example, although I may be 
expected to bear some costs in order to provide assistance to a stranger, 
I may be expected to bear greater cosL<> in order to provide compa-
rable assistance to my brother or my child. Second, it means that one's 
positive duties to one's associates often take precedence over one's 
positive duties to others in cases where the two conflict. Thus, for ex-
ample, if both my brother and a stranger need the same sort of as-
sistance, but I can provide this assistance only lO one of them, then I 
may be required to help my brother, even if I would have been re-
quired to help the stranger had he been the only person needing my 
assistance. Indeed, I may sometimes be required to help my brother 
even if his need is less urgem than the stranger's. Third, the idea of 
greater strength may also mean, although this is more controversial, 
that the threshold at which a positive duty can override a negative duty 
is sometimes lower if the positive duty is to an associate than it would 
be if the positive duty were to a stranger. For example, it may be thought 
that circumstances can arise in which I would be required or at least 
permitted to harm some person, or to violate his property rights, in 
order to provide a badly needed benefit for my brother or my child, 
even though it would be wrong for me to do the same thing in order 
to provide a comparable benefit for a stnmger. 
Note, however, that those who make this last supposition may 
equally well suppose that the threshold at which a positive duty can 
override a negative duty is sometimes highrrif the negalitJe duty is, say, 
to a family member, than it would be if the negative duty were to a 
stranger. For example, it may he thought that circumstances can arise 
in which it would be permissible for me to inflict a lesser harm on one 
stranger in order to prevent a much greater hann to another stranger, 
e\·en though it would be wrong for me to do the same thing if the per-
son on whom I would have to inflict the lesser harm were my own 
brother or child. This example shows that, on some interpretations 
at least, it is a mistake to think of associative duties as exclusively pos-
itive in character. For the example illustrates one way in which our 
negative duties to our associates may be thought stronger than our 
negative duties to others. And, as in the case of positive duties, this 
greater strength may be thought to manifest itself in other ways as well. 
Thus, it may be thought that one's negative duties to one's associates 
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are less easily nullified or overridden than one's negative duties tooth-
ers by considerations of cost to oneself. For example, although I may 
be expected to bear some costs in order to avoid harming a stranger, 
I may be expected to bear greater costs in order to avoid harming my 
brother or my child in the same way. Similarly, it may be thought that 
one's negative duties to one's associates take a certain precedence m•er 
one's negative duties to others in cases where the two conflict. So, for 
example, if one is driving a runaway trolley as it approaches a fork in 
the track, and one must either steer it onto the branch on which one's 
brother is trapped or onto the branch on which a stranger is trapped, 
then, on this view, one ought to do the latter. 
In view of these reflections, what we can say is the following. Within 
commonsense moral thought, the precise content of associative du-
ties is often unclear. It may vary depending on the nature of the re-
lationship giving rise to the duty, and, even with respect to a single 
type of relationship, the duties of the participants are often difTicult 
to delineate with precision. Speaking very generally, associative du-
ties require one to give the interests of one's associates priority of var-
ious kinds over the interests of other people. First, one must provide 
positive benefits for one's associates which one need not provide for 
other people at all, and which one may not provide for others in pref-
erence to one's associates. Indeed, providing such benefits for one's 
associates takes priority over the prmision to non-associates of any ben-
efit that one lacks a duty to provide. In addition, however, when con-
flicts among one's positive and/or negative duties arise, duties owed 
to one's associates take precedence of various sorts over duties to other 
people, although some of these forms of precedence are more con-
troversial than others. In general, for most types of relationships there 
is no detailed consensus either about the extent of the positive ben-
efits one must provide m· about the degree of precedence that asso-
ciative duties take. 
III. 
Despite the absence of greater consensus either about the content 
of associative duties or about which kinds of groups and relationships 
give rise to them, the importance of such duties in commonsense moral 
thought seems undeniable. Indeed, associative duties supply much of 
the subst<l.nce of morality as it is interpreted by most people. The will-
ingness to make sacrifices for one's family, one's friends, and one's 
community is ordinarily viewed as one of the marks of a good or vir-
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tuous person, and the demands of morality, as ordinarily understood, 
have less to do with the abstract formulations of philosophers than 
with the specific web of groups and relationships that serve to situate 
a person in social space. 
Nevertheless, two influential o~jections have been raised against 
the idea of an associative duty as we have been understanding it. The 
first of these, which we may call/he volu11larist objection, is, in effect, an 
objection on behalf of the individual who is supposed to he bound 
by such duties. The voluntarist objection asserts that mere member-
ship in a group or participation in a relationship cannot by itself give 
rise to any duties at all. Although it is tme that we sometimes have 
special responsibilities to our associates, we have such responsibilities, 
according to this objection, only insof~tr as we have ,·oluntarily incurred 
them. In other words, mere participation in a relationship or mem-
bership in a group is not sufficient to generate any special responsi-
bilities whatsoever. Instead, one's special responsibilities must always 
arise from some voluntary act on one's part: if not from one's explicit 
acceptance of those responsibilities, then perhaps from one's volun-
tary entry into the ~:,rroup or relationship in question- or if not from 
one's voluntary entry into the group or relationship in question, then 
perhaps from one's mluntai)' acceptance ofthe benefits of participation 
in that group or relationship.8 But, the voluntarist insists, one can-
not simply find oneself with such responsibilities without having done 
anything at all to acquire them. 
The voluntarist objection has been one m;tior impetus for an as-
similatio1listtreatment of associative duties. The assimilationist, as I have 
already indicated in passing, regards associative duties as being gen-
uine duties only insofar as they can be assimilated to other, plllatively 
less problematic types of duties.9 The voluntarist version of this posi-
tion treats associative duties as legitimate only insof~tr as they can be 
assimilated to contracttml duties broadly understood. I have already 
expressed doubts about the possibility of what might be called wholP-
sale monistic a.ssimilatio11: that is, about the possibility of assimilating the 
full range of perceh·ed associath·e duties to <my other single type of duty. 
In view of the diversity of groups and relationships that have been seen 
as gh·ing rise to such duties, any attempt at wholesale monistic assim-
ilation is bound to seem procrustean. However, this does not mean that 
monistic assimilationism as a general strategy is mistaken, only that, 
in its more plausible deployments, it will not offer any wholesale en-
dorsement of the full r.mge of associative duties that have been rec-
ognized within commonsense moral thought, but will tend instead to 
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be revisionist in character. For it will validate only those supposed du-
ties that it can plausibly assimilate, and this will inevimbly mean rejecting 
cenain others. Indeed, insofar as associative duties are seen within or-
dinary moral thought as constituting a fundamental class of duties in 
their own right, monistic assimilationism, in its more plausible de-
ployment<>, will be doubly rc\isionist. For it will fail to recognize some 
putative duties as being duties at all, and it will r~jcct the commonsense 
understanding of those duties that it does regard as genuine. 
These point<> may be illustrated with reference to the voluntarist 
version of monistic assimilation ism. It is clear, to begin with, that peo-
ple arc often seen as having associative duties by virtue of their par-
ticipation in some group or relationship even though their entry into 
the group or relationship in question was not accompanied by any ex-
plicit acceptance of those duties as such. In addition, we have already 
observed that some of the relationships that are thought to generate 
associative duties cannot be entered into voluntarily, while others 
cannot be ended voluntarily. In fact, some of the paradigmatic duty-
generating relationships can neither be entered into nor exited from 
voluntarily. The relations of children to their parents and siblings to 
each other are the most obvious examples. In other cases, groups that 
have been seen as generating associative duties can sometimes be joined 
voluntarily, but the more typical pattern is for members to be social-
ized into the group gradually in the course of their development, so 
that they come to see themselves as part of the group \\ithout any con-
sciousness of ever ha\ing made a decision to join it, and without any 
sense that there was ever a time in their lives when they were not part 
of it. So it is, often, with membership in a community or in a national 
or religious group. Even when relationships are indeed entered into 
voluntarily, moreover, this general description may mask considerable 
diversity; thus, for example, entering into a friendship is a very dif-
ferent process from joining a club, 10 and becoming a parent is very 
different from moving into a new neighborhood. 
It is this complex and diverse set off acts that drives many versions 
of voluntaristic assimilation ism to argue that a range of relationships 
that do not fit the voluntaristic model narrowly construed may nev-
ertheless be represented as contractual in an extended sense, and hence 
as duty-generating, because they involve the voluntary acceptance of 
benefits. At the same time, however, any relationships that cannot be 
represented as contractual c\·en in this extended sense must be re-
garded, according to these versions of assimilationism, as incapable 
of generating genuine duties at all. To the extent that this excludes 
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some commonly recognized duties, and to the extent that people do 
not ordinarily see their voluntary acceptance of benefits as the source 
of their associative duties, these versions of assimilationism are pre-
pared to be revisionist. As I have suggested, this illustrates the revi-
sionist tendency of monistic assimilation ism more gencrally. 11 
An ahernati\·e to monistic assimilationism is pluralistic assimila-
tionism. Rather than asserting that associath·e duties are genuine du-
ties only insofar as they can be assimilated to duties of some one 
other type, the pluralistic position seeks to assimilate different classes 
of associative duties to putatively less problematic duties of several dif-
ferent types. As compared with monistic assimilationism, the plural-
istic position appears, in the abstract, to hold out the promise of 
reduced revisionism without increased procrusteanism. In order to 
make good on this promise, however, the pluralist must first identif)· 
several different types of dmies, all of which arc clearer and better 
grounded than the unassimilatcd associath•e duties themselves. For 
those with voluntal'ist leanings, in particular, this may be difficult to 
do, since the voluntmist's reason for objecting to associative duties would 
seem equally to be a reason f(H· objecting to any special duties that 
cannot be construed on a broadly contracmal model. 
As I have said, the voluntarist o~jection to associative duties is, in 
ellcct, an objection on behalf of the individual who is supposed to be 
bound by such duties. Associative duties, if conceived of as ascribable 
to individuals in the absence of any t·elevant consensual act, would, 
according to the voluntarist, constitute an unreasonable constraint on 
the individuals in question. As I h;we also said, howe\·er, there is an-
other influential objection to associative duties. This ol~jection, which 
we may call the distributillt' objection, is, in effect, an ol~jection on be-
half of those individuals who arc not participants in the groups and 
relationships that arc thought to give rise to associatiw duties. The 
distributive objection sees such duties, not as imposing unreasonable 
burdens on the participants in special relationships, hut rather as sup-
plying them with benefits that may be unreasonable. This ol~jection 
may be developed as follows. 
AssociatiYe duties require indhiduals to giYe prim·ity of\'arious kinds 
to the interests of their associates. These requirements, however, work 
to the disadmntage of other people. Suppose, for example, that there 
arc three indi\,iduals, A, B, and C, none of whom has any special tie 
or relationship to any of the others. Each has only gcm·ral dmies to-
ward the others, which is to say that each's duties toward the others 
arc distributed equally. Indeed, a perfectly egalitarian distribution of 
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duty obtains among the three individuals, since none of the three has 
any special claim on the services of any of the others. Now, however, 
suppose that A and B, acting independently of each other, become 
members of some group of a kind that is ordinarily thought to give 
rise to associative duties. And suppose that C is not a member of this 
group, which we may call The In Group. If, as a result of their mem-
bership in The In Group, A and B come to have associative duties to 
each other, then the egalitarian distribution of duty that previously 
prevailed no longer obtains. Instead, A and B are now required to give 
each other's interests priority over the interests ofC in a wide range 
of contexts. Thus, each of them now has stronger claims on the other 
than C has on either of them. This means that, for each of them, C's 
interests have been demoted in relative importance. Indeed, C's 
claims on each of them are now weaker, not only than his claims on 
them were before, and not only than their claims on each other are 
now, but also than their claims on him are now. For, we may suppose, 
C has no associates to whose interests he is required to give priority 
over the interests of A and B. Thus, the claims on C of A and Bare as 
strong now as they ever were. The developments that have given his 
interests reduced priority for each of them have not given their in-
terests reduced priority for him; the reduction of priority is, in this 
way, asymmetrical. Clearly, then, the overall distribution of duty that 
now prevails is both inegalitarian and decidedly unfavorable to C. 
But, the distributive objection asks, why should the fact that A and 
B have become members of The In Group have these effects? Why 
should their membership in The Group work to C's disadvantage in 
this way? We may suppose that both A and B attach considerable sig-
nificance to their membership, that both experience their participa-
tion in The In Group as very rewarding, and, indeed, that each of them 
sees membership in the Group as an important aspect of his identity. 
None of these suppositions seems capable of explaining why their mem-
bership should, as a matter of morality, work to C's disadvantage in 
the way that it does if it generates associative duties. Indeed, the dis-
tributive objection continues, far from explaining this, these suppo-
sitions seem rather to make the need for such an explanation more 
acute. For if A and B derive great value from their membership in The 
In Group, then they already have an advantage that C lacks. The ef-
fect of associative duties is to build a second advantage on top of this 
first one. If, in other words, A and B have associative duties to each 
other, then, in addition to enjoying the rewards of Group member-
ship, which C lacks, A and B also get the benefit of having stronger 
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claims on each other's services than C has. Why should this be? Why 
should the fact that A and B arc in a position to enjoy the first sort of 
advantage give rise to a moral requirement that they should also get 
the second, and that C, who has already lost out with respect to the 
former, should now lose out with respect to the Iauer? 
This way of formulating the distributive objection suggests that the 
objection can also be directed against the voluntarist who seeks to as-
similate associative duties to contractual duties. For, even if associa-
tive duties are seen as arising from the voluntary acceptance by group 
members of the rewards of membership, the distributive objection will 
still challenge the idea that morality requires those who have secured 
such rewards to have their good fortune compounded through a fa-
vorable redistribution of duty, while those who never acquired the orig-
inal rewards arc further disf~lVorcd by that same redistribution. 
More generally, to the extent that members of The In Group have 
significantly greater resources than nonmembers independently of any 
redistribution of duty, the objection to such a redistribution will only 
be intensified, whether or not the greater resources that Group mem-
bers have are actually a consequence of their membership. Thus, for 
example, if A and B are much wealthier than C, either because this 
has always been so or because membership in The In Group has con-
ferred wealth upon them, the idea that morality requires them also 
to receive the advantage of having increased claims to each other's 
services will, according to the distributive objection, be all the more 
clearly open to question. Moreover, if we continue to assume that the 
members of The In Group are wealthier than C is, then the distribu-
tive objection will persist even if C and other people of modest means 
join together to establish a duty-generating group of their own. For 
proponents of the objection will still charge that, by requiring those 
who are wealthier to give each other's interests priority over the in-
terests of those who are poorer, associative duties unjustifiably rein-
force the inequality in resources between the two groups. 
In short, the distributive objection sees associative duties as pro-
viding additional advantages to people who have already benefited from 
participation in rewarding groups and relationships, and it views this 
as unjustifiable whenever the provision of these additional advan-
tages works to the detriment of people who are needier, whether 
they are needier because they are not themselves participants in re-
warding groups and relationships or because they have significantly 
fewer resources of other kinds. 
Many people will feel that the distributive objection has its great-
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est force when it is directed at those associath·c duties that arc some-
times said to obtain at the politicallcvcl, among members ofthe same 
community or society or nation. 12 At this level, the idea that associa-
tive duties provide a mandate for those who arc already J;ch in resources 
to turn their attention inward, and largely to ignore suffering and de-
privation in the rest of the world, is likely to have considerable reso-
nance for many people. However, once associative duties are seen as 
problematic at the political level, it is unclear why they shouldn't also 
seem problematic at the level of smaller-scale personal relationships. 
For associative duties also provide a mandate for relatively affluent f:un-
ilics, say, to turn tlwirattention inward, and to lavish resources upon 
each other while largely ignoring the needs of the less fortunate. In-
deed, by emphasizing the costs to others of those patterns of partial-
ity to one's intimates that are ordinarily seen as defining the abstract 
structure of "personal life," the distributive objection represents one 
way of challenging the very distinction between the personal and the 
political. 
IV. 
The formulation of the distributive objection that we have been 
discussing describes associative duties as providing additional advan-
tages for people who have already secured the advantage of partici-
pation in rewarding groups and relationships. One response to the 
objection might be to deny that the two types of advantage arc sepa-
rable in the way that this formulation suggests. It is a mistake, or so it 
may be said, to suppose that first a rewarding relationship is established 
between two people, or among the members of a group, and 1/um a 
question arises about how, if at all, this relationship affects the duties 
of the participants. Instead, it may be argued, an implicit commitment 
by the participants to give priority to each other's interests in various 
contexts is a precondition for the existence of a rewarding relation-
ship. And, the argument may continue, it is such commitments that 
give rise to associative duties. Thus, it may be said, people cannot de-
rive rewards from their participation in special relationships without 
acquiring associative duties, and any advantages they may prm·ide, in 
the process. 
Proponents of the distributive objection may reply that if people 
have a strong interest in obtaining the rewards deriving from partic-
ipation in special relationships, and if they cannot obtain those rewards 
without acquiring associative duties in the process, than all that fol-
12 
lows is that people have a strong interest in acquit-ing such duties-
a conclusion that docs not rebut the distributh·e o~jection but rather 
concedes one of its main claims. However, defenders of associative du-
ties may respond that people's interest in obtaining the rewards of spe-
cial relationships is so strong that morality cannot possibly fail to 
accommodate it. Thos<.· rewards arc among the greatest goods that 
human beings can enjoy, and morality must surely permit people to 
make the kinds of commitments on which the rewards depend. Ac-
cordingly, it may be said, associati\·c duties should be seen as arising 
out of commitments that people permissibly make to each other. 
This amounts to a two-stage defense of associative duties. The first 
stage appeals to people's strong interest in panicipating in reward-
ing social relationships to secure the permissibility of making the 
commitments on which such relationships are said to depend. The 
second stage identifies those commitments as the actual source of peo-
ple's associative duties. Thus, according to this defense, one does not 
acquire associative duties simply by virtue of standing in a special re-
lationship to some person or by virtue of belonging to some special 
group. Instead, one acquires such duties when one makes a commit-
ment to one's associates, either explicitly or implicitly, that includes 
an undertaking to give priority to their interests in various contexts. 
The first thing to notice about this defense is the extent of the con-
cessions that it makes to the voluntarist ol~jection in the course of try-
ing to ward off the distributive objection. By denying that either the 
mere fact of group membership or the mere existence of a special re-
lationship can give a person associative duties, and by insisting that 
one cannot acquire such duties \~itout making some commitment one-
self, this defense brings associative duties entrely under the control 
of the will. Indeed, its identification of commitment as the relevant 
duty-generating factor appears to relegate this defense to a form of 
voluntaristic assimilation ism, and a highly revisionist one at that. For, 
to take an obvious example, we do not ordinarily suppose that par-
ents have special duties to their children only ifthey have made a com-
mitment to give priority to the children's interests. 
At the same time, this defense of associative duties is unlikely to 
defuse the distributive objection. For that ol~jection docs not deny that 
people have a strong interest in participating in various groups and 
relationships, and hence in committing themselves to give priority to 
their associates. On the contrary, the distributive ol~jection is quite 
sensitive to the way in which such commitments serve the interests of 
the participants in special relationships. However, it argues that the 
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participants are not the only people whose interests are affected when 
such commitments are made; those who arc not participants also 
have interests at stake, and their interests arc apt to be especially 
strong when they already have fewer resources than the participants 
do. Accordingly, the distributive objection insists that, at the very 
least, the permissibility of undertaking to give priority to the interests 
of one's associates must be seen as sharply constrained by considera-
tion of the effects on others of one's doing so. The proposed defense 
of associative duties does not really engage with this position, and so 
seems incapable of undermining it. 
In addition, those who are sympathetic to the distributive objec-
tion may point out that although this defense says that associative du-
ties arise out of people's permissible commitments, it does not actually 
explain how this happens. It appeals to people's interest in partici-
pating in interpersonal relationships to explain the permissibility of 
the commitments, but it provides no explanation of why the com-
mitments give rise to duties. Of course, if people's strong interest in 
participating in interpersonal relationships makes it permissible for 
them to undertake to give priority to their associates, then the same 
consideration may also make it permissible for them actually to give 
priority to their associates. However, the idea of associative duties is 
not that one is permitted but rather that one is required to give such 
priority, and it is this further idea that requires explanation. More-
over, those sympathetic to the distributive objection may say, no ap-
peal to the interests of those who make the commitments is capable 
of providing such an explanation. For the fact that people have le-
gitimate self-interested reasons for making and acting on certain com-
mitments docs not explain why they have a duty to honor those 
commitments even if doing so works to the significant disadvantage 
of third parties. After all, we do not in general think that, if one has 
a legitimate interest in acting in some ·way that does not benefit oth-
ers, then one is morally required not to benefit them. Thus, propo-
nents of the distributive objection may argue, some other strategy is 
needed for explaining why commitments give rise to duties, rather than 
mere permissions, to favor one's associates. One obvious strategy 
would appeal not to the interest'! of those who make the commitments 
bur rather to the interests of those who receive them. However, pro-
ponents of the distributive objection will insist that, in assessing the 
normative implications of interpersonal commitments, both these 
sets of interests must be balanced against the interests of those who 
will lose out if the commitments are indeed honored. 
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Thus, to recapitulate, it may he argued that associative duties are 
generated hy commitments which people must make to each other if 
they arc to establish rewarding relationships, and which morality pcr-
mito; them to make for that reason. However, this "defenseft of asso-
ciative chilies is tantamount to a f(mn of voluntaristic assimilationism. 
At the same time, it is unlikely to satisfy proponents of the distribu-
tive ol~jcction, who may press two points in response. First, they may 
argue that the permissibility of committing oneself to give priority lO 
one's associates is constrained by the effects of those commitments 
on other people. Second, they may insist that some additional ex-
planation is required of how permissible commitments give rise to as-
sociative duties. No appeal to the interests of those who make the 
commitments can provide such an explanation, they may argue, and 
any appeal to the interests of those who receive the commitments must 
be balanced by a consideration of the interest<; of those who do not 
receive them. 
The question of how permissible commitments give rise to duties 
has, of course, been extensively discussed in the special case of promis-
ing. Although even the most thoroughgoing voluntarist is unlikely to 
argue that all genuine associative duties arise from actual promises, 
certain features of the promising example may appear to be of more 
general relevance. The standard function of promises, it is often said, 
is to facilitate social cooperation by prm·iding promisees with a spe-
cial kind of assurance. ~laking a promise provides such assurance be-
cause, in promising, one communicates an intention to incur an 
obligation by that very act of communication. In other words, one ex-
presses one's intention to make ill he case by virtue of that very expression 
of intention that one has a special kind of reason f(H· acting as OIW 
says one will act. Without assurances of this kind, it is asserted, coop-
erative undertakings would often be difficult or even impossible toes-
tablish and sustain. Now it might be argued, by partial analogy to this 
case, that the commitments that give rise to associative duties make 
rewarding relationships possible precisely because they are seen by the 
participant<; in such relationships as generating special, duty-based rea-
sons for giving priority to each other's interests. This perception, it 
might he argued, enables these commitments to provide a kind of as-
surance without which rewarding relationships would be difficult or 
impossible to establish and sustain. Accordingly, it might be sug-
gested, the reason why these commitments gh·e rise to associative du-
ties is that the perception of them as giving tise to such duties is what 
enables them to make rewarding relationships possible. 
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Proponents of the distributive objection are likely to offer at least 
two replies to this argument. The first is that the participants in spe-
cial relationships often have, and are seen as having, strong reasons 
apart from any perceived associative duties for ghing priority to each 
other's interests. These reasons may derive, for example, from their 
love for each other, or from some shared identification or interest. 
Often it is reasons of this kind that motivate interpersonal commit-
ments, and, it may be said, the recognition of such reasons is often 
sufficient to sustain rewarding relationships without any additional as-
surance provided by a shared perception of duty. The second reply 
is that even if a perception that interpersonal commitments give rise 
to duties is what enables such commitments to facilitate special rela-
tionships, this by itself docs not show that these commitments really 
do give rise to duties. The promising case, it may be said, is similar, 
for the mere fact that one communicates an intention to incur an oblig-
ation docs not itself explain how this brings it about that one actually 
does incur an obligation. Just what the explanation may be remains 
a matter of controversy, but many accounts appeal, in the end, either 
to the interests of promisors in being able to bind themselves, or to 
the interests of promisees in being able to rely on promises that arc 
made to them, or to a general social interest in the existence of a sta-
ble practice of promising. And, proponents of the distributive ol~jec­
tion may say, if any of these accounts is taken as the model for 
associative duties, then the case for such duties will once again rest, 
ultimately, on a kind ofinterest that needs to be balanced against the 
interests of those who are not participant'> in the putatively duty-gen-
erating groups and relationships. 13 
Thus it remains the case that the defense of associative duties that 
we have been discussing is apt to be challenged by proponents of the 
distributive objection despite the extensive concessions that it makes 
to the voluntarist objection. This confirms our earlier observation that 
the distributive objection may be directed against associative duties, 
not only when they are conceived of as constituting a fundamental 
category in their own right, but also when they arc construed along 
voluntaristic lines. It is worth reflecting on why this is so. We have al-
ready observed that whereas the voluntarist objection to unassimilated 
associative duties is, in effect, an objection on behalf of those who are 
supposed to be bound by such duties, the distributive objection is, in 
effect, an o~jection on behalf of those to whom such duties arc sup-
posed nol to be owed. This contrast may be further developed. The 
voluntarist objection is sensitive to the potentially burdensome char-
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acter of social life, to the costs that must be incurred and the sacri-
fices that must be made in order for a human relationship to be sus-
tained. The voluntarist, sensitive to these cosL'!, argues that agenL'! should 
not be required to bear them against their wills. Since this is precisely 
what unassimilated associative duties may require, such duties arc them-
selves perceived as unreasonably burdensome, and arc rt:jectcd ac-
cordingly. The distributive objection, however, is sensitive to the 
enormous t·ewards of social life, to the unparalleled capacity of in-
terpersonal relations to enrich human existence. In consequence, it 
sees the opportunity to assist one's associates, and so to contribute to 
the flourishing of one's social relationships, as a great luxury. Ac-
cordingly, when it is suggested that one may be required to provide 
such assistance even if doing so works to the detriment of those who 
are already needier, the distributive objection perceives this as con-
ferring a great benefit on oneself and one's associates: a benefit that 
is so great, in fact, as to amount to an unfair advantage. So far as this 
perception is concerned, moreover, it makes no diflcrcncc whether 
such requirements are thought of as arising from some voluntary act 
on the part of the agent or not. Either way, they arc seen as unfairly 
benefitting the agent and his or her associates. Since associative du-
ties are requirements of precisely this kind, the distributive ol~jcction 
\icws them as problematic whether or not they arc construed as sus-
ceptible to voluntaristic <L'Isimilation. 
Clearly, both objections capture part of the truth about human re-
lationships. For such relationships can of course be both burden-
some and rewarding. They make great demands, but they arc a source 
of incomparable satisfactions. They may call for great sacrifices, yet 
there arc some sacrifices that it is a luxury to be able to make. And 
just as both objections capture part of the truth about human rela-
tionships, so too both capture part of the truth about associative du-
ties. For, insofar a'l such duties would impose burdens upon us without 
our consent, they constitute genuine constraints. Yet, insofar as they 
would have us cultivate rewarding tics even when there arc more ur-
gent needs to be met, they also confer genuine advantages. Like our 
social lives themselves, the associative duties that arc so often thought 
to accompany them may be demanding and enriching at once. The 
voluntarist o~jcction focuses on the demands, and judges these to be 
unreasonable insofar a'\ they are imposed without our agreement. The 
distributive objection focuses on the advantages, and judges these to 
be unreasonable insofar as they work to the detriment of those who 
are needier. 
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And, yet, there is a tenacious strand of ordinary moral opinion that 
dismisses both objcctons, and continues to sec associative duties as 
cemral components of moral experience. In so doing, it recognizes 
some claims upon us whose source lies neither in our own choices nor 
in the needs of others, but rather in the complex and constantly 
evolving constellation of social and historical relations into which we 
enter the moment we are born. For we arc, after all, born to parcnlo; 
we did not choose at a time we did not choose; and we land in some 
region we did not choose of a social world we did not choose. And, 
from the moment of our birth and sometimes sooner, claims arc 
made on us and for us and to us. We arc claimed by f:unilics and clans, 
by nations and states, by mccs and religions, by cultures and com-
munities and classes - all clamoring to confer privileges and re-
sponsibilities upon us, and to initiate us into their histories and their 
traditions, their sorrows and their joys, their passions and their hatreds, 
theinvisdom and their follies. And if~ in due course, we inject our own 
wills into this mix- straining against some tics and embracing oth-
ers, sometimes severing old bonds and sometimes acquiring new ones 
-the verdict of common moral opinion seems to be that we can ne\·er 
simply wipe the slate clean. Our specific historical and social identi-
ties, as they develop and evoh•c over time, continue to call forth claims 
with which we must reckon: claims that cannot without distortion he 
construed as contractual in character, and which arc not reduced to 
silence by gcncml considerations of need. 
At the same time, the voluntarist and distributive objections arc 
not themselves alien to ordinary moral opinion, for both of them arc 
rooted in values that arc also securely entrenched within modern moral 
thought. The voluntarist objection grows out of an ideal of freedom 
and autonomy which is one of the hallmarks of a liberal society and 
which has a central place in our evaluative outlook. The distributive 
objection is rooted in a principle of equality which is also a funda-
mental tenet of modern momlthought, and which asserts that all peo-
ple, however varied their relations to us m<lY happen to be, arc 
nevertheless of equal value and importance. The problem, then, is 
not that these objections to associative duties arc alien to us. On the 
contrary, the problem is that both ussociutivc duties und the vulucs 
that generate objections to them exert genuine authority within our 
moral thought, so tlmt what might othcnvisc be a mere clash of 
philosophical positions is instead a deep conflict within contempo-
rary moral life. 
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v. 
This brings us back to the point from which we began. As we seek 
to orient ourselves in relation to the conflicting tendt•tKies toward 
global integration and communal differentiation that I mentioned at 
the out'iet of this lcctun·, no resource would be more helpful than a 
settled conception of our responsibilities toward others. Unfortu-
nately, howe,·er, this is a resource we can suppose ourselves to pos-
sess only if we are prepared to repudiate some of the values we hold 
dearest. For, in the end, those values pull us in genuinely different 
directions on questions of responsibility. We prize our freedom to 
choose, and thus to control the extent of our duties to others. Yet we 
arc committed to the <.~quality of persons, and arc sensitive to claims 
of need that do not themselves spring from choices we have made. 
Moreover, most of us recognize a region of moral space that is occu-
pied hy claims deriving neitlwr from our own choices nor from the 
needs of others, but rather fhnn our membership in particular groups 
and our participation in pankular relationships. So it is little wonder, 
then, that we tend to flounder as we confront a world in which the 
boundaries of responsibility arc increasingly contested. We are swayed 
hy the sophisticated, cosmopolitan rhetoric of global integration, and 
we arc genuinely moved hy sccm~s of starvation and disease in faraway 
lands, but, at the same time, we resist those ideas of global justice that 
might broaden the scope of our own responsibility and threaten our 
standard of living. We recoil in horror from the bloody ethnic con-
flicts of which television has made us all spectators, hut we celebrate 
diversity and difference and are suspicious of the idea of a common 
culture. We decry the fr<lgmentation of our societies, hut we seek above 
all else to protect and promote the interests of those who arc dearest 
to us. 'We insist on our status as autonomous agents and on the cen-
trality of our freedom to <~hoose, but increasingly W<~ st·e ourselves as 
victims and blame others f(u· our misfortunes, as if to indicate how lit-
tle we see our own choices as counting for in a world of complex in-
terdependencies, massi\·e institutional structures, and breathtaking new 
technologies. In all of these ways and more, we rewal that we have 
lost any sure sense of our responsibilities toward utlwrs and their re-
sponsibilities toward us. The idea of associativt• duties, important as 
it continues to be to us, Gill by itself provide no solution to this prob-
lem. Instead, the quest for a satisf~lctory conception of associative du-
ties is but one part of a much larger task: the task of trying to identity 
a conception of responsibility we can live with in a world where the 
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distribution of responsibility has become one of the most divisive 
questions of all. 14 
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